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ABSTRACT 
· Meteorological conditions leading. to the crash of an airliner short of the runway of a New York airport 
were studied. Thunderstorm downdrafts much stronger than those measured on the 1946-47 Thunderstorm 
Project were found. These exceptional downdrafts have been designated as "downbursts." The violent 
cloud systems that produce downburst cells can be identified in the form of forward extensions of radar 
echoes designated as "spearhead echoes" which move with unusual speed. The development of downburst 
cells appears to be tied in with overshooting tops of clouds at the anvil level. 
1. Introduction 
An airliner crashed short of the runway at John F. 
Kennedy International Airport, New York, on 24 June 
1975. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(1975), in its investigation of the accident, concluded 
that it was caused by unusually sharp wind changes 
under a thundershower. Realizing that a similar un-
expected sinking of an aircraft at low approach levels 
might happen again, airline operations personnel asked 
for an analysis of the meteorological events with a view 
toward finding a way to give w~rnings of such condi-
tions without needlessly closing the airport. 
The ·resulting report (Fujita, 1976) used patterns 
seen by radar plus other meteorological features which 
would be helpful in pinpointing happenings of this 
kind. The purpose of this article is to place these. find-
ings before the meteorological community. 
A striking ·feature of the airport weather on the 
afternoon of the accident was a stationary sea-breeze 
front holding for an hour or more near the touchdown 
point of the active runway (22 L). Over the airport, 
south of this shallow front, gentle southerly winds 
prevailed, while to the north . in the near-approach 
area, hazardous winds and weather were found. As will 
be noted later, the sea-breeze front had no marked 
effect on the growth of the thunderstorm, which was 
already violent before it reached the area. But the 
front had an indirect effect on events in that the airport 
wind sensor was located near the seaward end of the 
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runway and thus called for easy 220° landings, while 
just beyond the other end of the runway unknown wind 
extremes . were ·occurring. As a matter of fact, while 
rain poured down at the approach end, most of. the 
runway was dry. Controllers had no basis for changing 
runways or closing the field to air traffic. 
On the day of the accident {24 June 1975); the cor-
rected synoptic analysis showed a ·weak cold front 
running northeast to southwest moving slowly into the 
region, with thunderstorms along and near it. For the 
mesoscale study, the satellite, ground radar. and surface 
station data through the ,afternoon hours (1735-:-2159 
GMT) were analyzed on the base map of Fig. 1, which 
also shows the location of the various reporting sta-
tions. The three radar sites (Atlantic City, McGuire 
Air Force Base anp New York City) are marked by 
right-angle crosses on the map and the three principal 
airports of the New York .area [ Newark (EWR), La 
Guardia (LGA) and John F. Kennedy (JFK)] are 
shown in bold letters. 
2. Satellite data 
The life history of the JFK thunderstorm was de-
picted by the infrared (IR) and visible images of 
SMS-1, a geostationary satellite positioned above the 
equator at 75°W. A pair of IR and visible pictures was 
sent every 30 min. The satellite imagery closest to 2005 
·(all times GMT), the accident time, was at about 2003. 
As seen in the hand-drafted representation of Fig. 2, 
there were two shadows of anvil clouds sp.reading out 
from the. storm tops. The viewing angle of 50° from 
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FIG. 3. IR picture at 1903 G¥T. 
tops look di~placed northward from their true geo-
graphical positions; hence the shadows may look wrong 
for the sun angle at this meridian at .this time. The 
anvil heights were computed from the cloud-shadow 
relationship. As shown by the arrows, the spreading 
rate of the anvils toward the east-northeast was 30 kt. 
An arc cloud was seen along the south coast of Long 
Island passing through the JFK airport. Usually an arc 
cloud pushes outward rapidly from a thunderstorm 
area, but the sea breeze kept it from going beyond JFK. 
The JFK thunderstorm was first seen at 1703 as 
a cumulus line in northern New Jersey. Within 30 min 
the west end of this line grew into a towering cumulus 
mass. At 1803 the west end became overwhelmingly 
larger than the east end, and by 1903 a fast-growing 
anvil formed on the west end, seen in the IR pic:;ture 
of Fig. 3 a5 A, lightly overlapping the east end, desig-
nated as B. Note the inverted T at JFK denoting the 
projection of an imaginary 45 000 ft tower as seen from 
the satellite :viewing angle. In the IR picture at 1933 
(Fig. 4) A and B hav.e come closer together and a light 
grey area has appeared inside cloud A. The equivalent 
blackbody temperature at the boundary of this area 
was -44°C. At 2003 (Fig. 5) clouds A ·and B had 
joined into a large thunderstorm complex. This is the 
IR picture which, combined with the visible, was used 
to draw Fig. 2. The accident happened 2 min later. 
Three pictures taken at half-hour intervals thereafter 
revealed that the areas of cloud as well as the areas of 
cold cloud tops kept increasing. However, the rate of 
spread of the IR cloud was fastest at about .2000. Like-
wise, the growth rate of the -44°C area was greatest 
at about the same time. Furthermore, the area covered 
by radar echo reached its maximum at that time. These 
Fm. 4. IR picture at 1933 GMT. 
132 MONTHLY WEATHER REVIEW VOLUME 105 
FIG. 5. IR picture at 2003 GMT, 2 min before the aircraft accident at JFK. 
developments are shown by the three area-time curves 
of Fig. 6. They suggestthat the accident occurred when 
the JFK thunderstorm was in its most active stage. 
3. Mesoscale weather situation 
The mesoscale analysis map for 1753 in Fig. 7 shows 
the weak front from Pennsylvania to Rhode Island. It 
was a true cold front at the surface in Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, where it w~s very" hot to the south and 
the temperature contrast was enhanced by the showers 
just to the north of the front. From southern Connecti-
cut to Rhode Island the temperature contrast across 
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FIG. 6. Variation of areas of cloud imagery and radar echoes 
during a 6 h period on 24 June 1975. 
sence of clouds suggested heating and drying at the 
surface by subsidence or downslope winds. However, a 
line of s.ea-b.reeze cumuli was seen in southern Con-
necticut and Rhode Island. Due to solar heating, the 
sea breeze was blowing inland across the Atlantic 
beaches and apparently there was also a weak sea 
breeze on the north shore of Long Island coming from 
the Sound, giving rise to the formation of sea-breeze 
cumuli there. Radar echoes showed an early stage of 
the JFK thunderstorm (A and B) in northwestern 
New Jersey on the cold front. The storm was moving 
toward the east-southeast at 16 kt. 
At 1851 the main storm (A) was still on the front 
. but the forerunner (B) moved away from the front 
and. split into two cells- one located over lower Man-
hattan· and the other northeast of LGA (Fig. 8). 
Dramatic changes in the echo patterns took place in 
the hour from 1900 to 2000, just before the accident. 
The JFK thunderstorm moved rapidly toward the 
western tip of Long Island. A line of arc cloud developed 
along the leading edge of the thunderstorm outflow, the 
southern part of which was held back by the cold sea 
breeze from the Atlantic. In fact, the sea-breeze tem-
perature was lower than that of the ·thunderstorm out-
flow (Fig. 9). The squall-line activity in eastern 
Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey was intensify-
ing rapidly. As a result, a surge of northwesterly winds 
c;ame forth in advance of a line of echoes. 
The map at 2053, not reproduced here, showed the 
JFK .thunderstorm to be weakenii:J.g and accompanied 
by a radial outflow of cold air which by this time had 
reached the airport with a light NNE wind. A larger 
system with an intense squall line was advancing 
toward central New Jersey. 
The JFK thunderstorm was monitored by radar at 
three stations: 1) WSR-57 radar at the National 
Weather Service Forecast Office at Rockefeller Center, 
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FIG. 7. Mesoscale weather situation at 1753 GMT showing isotherms, streamlines and. radar echoes. Numbers at 





FIG. 8. As in Fig. 7 except at 1851 GMT. 
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FIG. 9. As in Fig. 7 except at 2oq2 GMT. Aircraft accident occurred at 2005 GMT and the airport was closed. 
New York .City (NYC); 2) AN/ FPS-77 radar at 
McGuire Air Force Base, N. J. (MCG); and 3) WSR-57 
radar at Atlantic City, N. J. (ACY). A total of seven 
measurements of the echo tops of the thunderstorm 
were made by these three stations. The results are given 
in Fig. 10, where the lines from the radars are drawn to 
maximum altitude points (heights given in feet). 
Arrows show ditec.tion and speed (kt) of echo motion. 
After c;orrections, the echo~top height ranged between 
35 000 and 49 000 ft. The NYC radar was checked 
under the direction of Gibson (1975) who found 
everything to b~ within required tolerance. Correc-
tions made to the radar took account of the following: 
1) McGuire AFB radar has a tendency to under-
estimate the range by 10- 15%; 2) the further the 
· cloud distance from the radar, the higher the echo 
top ; 3) it is unlikely that the top of an identical echo 
was measured simultaneously, and the echo· top varied 
rapidly with time. 
Taking the satellite pictures, nearby radio!)onde and 
radar data foto consideration, one may assume that 
the thunderstorm was topped by anvil clouds at 40 000 
to 43 000 ft. Since the equivalent blackbody tempera-
ture of the anvil was colder than -44 °C (air tempera-
ture at 36 000 ft) but warmer than -58°C (air tem-
perature at 41 000 ft), its emissivity must have been 
< 1.00. The anvil must have been relatively thin. 
The detailed mesoscale weather analyses presented 
in this section provide a better understanding of the 
local weather of 24 June 1975. Yet they do not tell 
why the JFK thunderstorm was more dangerous than 
numerous other storms that have been studied in detail. 
4. Spearhead echo 
In a manuscript report prepared after the accident, 
Gibson (1975) emphasized a very important character-
istic of the JFK thunderstorm. Echo A moved to the 
east-southeast at a speed of 30-35 kt, while the fore-
runner echoes were moving in the same direction at 
20- 25 kt. The greater speed of echo A resulted in an 
overtaking arid subsequent merger of echoes. All of this 
was taking place in the immediate vicinity of JFK at 
the approximate time of the accident. · 
Expanding on Gibson's findings, Fujita (1976) made 
a time-sequence analysis of the JFK thundei:storm (Fig. 
11), displaying the '.appearance of the echoes at 11 min 
.. intervals. It is evident that two forerunner echoes 
existed to the north and northwest of JFK at 1905 and 
moved slowly toward the ea.St-southeast. The echo that 
was moving behind the JFK thunderstorm al.so traveled 
slowly. The motion of these echoes was only 15- 17 kt: 
At 1916 the JFK thunderstorm had shown a sudden 
acceleration toward JFK. One should find a reason for 
this fast movement of the echo. 
Within the 11 min between l 905 and 1916, an ap-
pendage formed near the east end of the major echo. 
The first .. appendage, seen in the 1910.7 picture, was 
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3 mi long with a sharp point •. The point, actirig·like· a 
spearhead, extended very rapidly. By 1940 the si)ear-
head became-so large that the parent echo began losing 
. its identity,· so that by 1951 the parent echo was not 
only drawn ·entirely into the appendage but the com-
bined echo was moving rapidly toward JFK airport. 
The appendage had now lost its identity, redeveloping 
into a fast-m:oving spearhead echo which merged with 
a small echo located to the north of JFK: 
The spearhead echo at 2002 was about 15 mi long 
and 5 mi wide and located just north of the airport. 
The radar picture was taken from the Atlantic City 
radar, 80 mi away, with a 0.2° antenna tilt angle. The 
height of the radar beam above JFK was computed to 
be about 7000 ft. Due to the beam width the image of a 
point target elongates in the direction perpendicular to 
the beam. The elongation for a 1 ° beam width is 1.3 mi 
at 80 mi. The radar images are evaluated taking these 
values into consideration. 
We now define .a spearhead echo. It is a radar echo 
with a pointed appendage extending toward the direc-
tion of the echo motion. The appendage moves faster 
than the parent echo which is being drawn into the 
appendage. During the mature stage, the appendage 
turns into a major echo and the parent echo loses its 
identity. Ground-based weather radar wilt"be able to 
detect such a spearhead echo.2 
In an attempt to determine the frequency of spear-
head echoes on 24 June 1975, the Atla1.1tic City radar 
film was examined in detail, leading to the finding of 
another spearhead echo. The second one formed just to 
the north of Allentown; Pa. At 20°15 the echo was about 
90 mi from the Atlantic City radar. Its development 
and movement are shown in Fig. · 12. The life of a 
spearhead echq seems to be relatively short. The ap- . 
pendage of the JFK echo started forming at ·1910, 
reaching its mature stage in about 50 min. The Allen-
town echo repeated a similar cycle between 2015 and 
2111. The map of Fig. 13 shows these two develop-
ments. It was fortunate that Allentown aiq)ort was not 
affected by the spearhead echo. 
The question naturally arises: What is the proba-
bility of occurrence of a spearhead .echo? For 24 June 
this question was examined from the Atlantif Cicy-
radar data. The hourly counts of echoes · over the- · 
Middle Atlantic States are summarized in Table 1. 
Only two out of 109 echoes are classified as spearhead 
echoes. All others were, more or less, summertime echoes 
which probably do not present serious problems to 
aviation. The chance that a spearhead echo would 
develop at such a crucial point at a given airport must 
be very small indeed. 
Gibson (197~) found thaJ the only report on this 
2 An anonymous editorial reviewer of this manuscript suggested 
that the spearhead echo is what airline meteorologists designate as 
"fingers" seen on airborne radar displays (see, e.g., Harrison, 
1956; Hoffman and Peckham, 1968). It is not clear to the present 
authors that the two features are the same except in special cases. 
FIG. 10. Height of echo top_s of the JFK thunderstorm measured 
by three· radars: ·Atlantic City, · McGuire Air Force Base and 
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FIG. 11. Forination and advance of spearhead· echo. Small 
_circles show relative positions of JFK airport at the various 
times. Heavy: dashed line marks the tip of the spearhead. 
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FIG. 12. Another spearhead echo of 24 June "1975, which 
developed north of Allentown ·Airport, Pa. 
date of a wind gust ~ 35 kt came from Morristown, N. J. 
Municipal Airport, which reported _55 kt occurring at 
1915. Although he does not preclude the possibility of 
an unreported occurrence, this record was . the only 
such report from northern New Jersey, New York City 
and Long Island. A spearhead,· echo was forming just 
to the north of the Morristown· airport when the 55 kt 
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wi~d was reported (Fig. 13). It is interesting to note 
that the spearhead echo passed between the four sta-
tions in the New York area- Central Park, Newark, 
La Guardia and JFK; thus the maximum recorded 
wind speed in the area (32 kt at EWR, 1937 GMT), 
was simply a reflection· of . the mean motion of echo A. 
5. Time-space analysis of approach area 
During the critical period of 22 min prior to the 
accident at 2005.2 GMT, 12 airplanes made approaches 
along the localizer course of the instrument landing 
system (ILS) of runway 22-L. However, not all.aircraft 
encountered difficulties serious enough to cause the 
pilots to report them to the tower. The chronological 
events experienced by the landing aircraft are given in 
Table 2. The detailed testimony of the pilots is sum-
marized at greater length by Fujita (1976). 
It is important, first of all, to recognize that the 
landing difficulties occurred during three disti.nct 
periods separated by normal landings. The three 
ATLANTIC 
OCEAN 
FIG. 13. Isocbrones of the boundaries of two spearhead echoes showing their 
development in approximately 1 h. 
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FIG. 14. Time-space coordinates of the 22-L approach path relative to the moving weather systems. The glide slope, the outer marker 
(LOM) and middle marker (MM), and runways were shifted toward 292° true at 30 kt. Aircraft headings at 10 s intervals are plotted 
after subtracting the magnetic heading of the runway. The directions of small arrows are exaggerated five times. Inset at left shows 
portion of airport containing runways 22-L and 22-R. 
periods were 1945 to 1952, · 1952 to 1959 .and 2002-
2005+. If we assume the motion of the spearhead echo 
to be at 30 kt, the horizontal dimension of the hazard-
ous areas would be only 3- 5 mi. A pilot could complete 
a normal approach and landing during the calmer inter-
ludes without being able to see or be aware of the danger 
areas on either side of his approach path. 
The airflow patterns near the approach end of run-
way 22-L can be depicted by plotting the events ex-
perienced by each aircraft as revealed in flight recorders 
and pilots' remarks in exhibits of the investigation by 
the National Transportation Safety Board (1975). To 
overcome analytical difficulties, the concept of time-
space coordinates was developed. For the original ideas 
one may refer io Fujita (1963). The coordin;i.tes consist 
of the paths of the aircraft shifted successively in a 
direction opposite to that of the movemenfof the spear-
head echo. In constructing the time-space coordinates 
for this study, the approach path of runway 22-L was 
shifted toward 292° true (304 ° magnetic) at 30 kt 
(Fig. 14). 
The coordinates were designed to include the touch-
down times between 1943 and 2021. A map of the JFK 
area corresponding to the localizer approach of the 
accident aircraft L was placed in the coordinates. The 
black circles with the time in GMT denote the 1 min 
positions of the landing aircraft. The take-off positions 
of the departing aircraft are shown by larger open 
circles, and their paths are given by the light, double-
lined arrows. The heights along the glide slope are shown 
at 100 ft intervals. Actual heights are indicated for 
those aircraft for which radar and altimeter altitudes 
were available. As a measure of the crosswind compo-
nent, the aircraft headings at 10 s intervals were plotted 
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Approach and landing conditions 
Some wind shear; not enough to report 
Add power, 500 ft down: normal 
landing 
Downdraft before touchdown in rain 
Approach and landing n<'>rmal 
Slight rain at touchdown 
.Some wind shear; not enough to report 
At 200 ft, 8° drift to left 
Strong sink, strong cro~wind 
.Plane sank, drifted right; abandoned 
approach 
Landed normally without difficulties 
Add power in sipk;· landing normal 
Strong downburst, 400 ft down. 
Accident. 
•• E:xperienc~d major difficulty. 
i:.!?.ft-t 
after subtracting the ·magnetic heading of the runw.ay. 
Since the crosswind component was mostly from the 
right, most aircraft kept correcting a 1- .8° drift during 
the approaches. The experience of aii:craft H was ex-
treme in this respect. 
The events experienced by aircraft A through N were 
replotted on the time-space coordinates in order to 
correlate them with the meteorological conditions (Fig. 
15). The result revealed the existence of three major 
areas of localized outflo:w. There must have been a 
concentrated downward motion above . each <>f these 
outflow areas, for without a massive supply of descend-
ing air, the intense outflow· could not have originated 
nor have been maintained. ' 
The ·concept of a downdraft in a thunderstorm has 
appeared · in the Ii terature for many years, such as in 
an article by Brooks (1922). Quantitative measurements 
were provided by Byers and Braham in The Thunder-
storm. They tabulated as a downdraft any sustained, 
non-horizontal current of air descending in a thunder-
~· ~ 
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. FIG. 15. Three downburst.cells a)ld sea-breeze front depicted on same time-space coordinates as in Fig. 14. 
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FIG. 16. Four downburst cells in relation to spearhead echo and flight' operations at 1951.4 GMT. 
storm at a speed exceeding 3 ft s-1• To distinguish an affected by the outflow wind. The sea-breeze front lay 
extremely intense downdraft from an ordinary one; a between the wind sensor and the approach path to 
new term, "downburst" is introduced. A downburst ·iS runway 22-L : 
a localized, intense downdraft with vertical currents The ground-level wind near the north boundary of 
exceeding a downward speed of 12 ft s-1 at 300 ft the airport was entirely different from the reported 
above the surface. This value corresponds to a · winds: The captain of departing aircraft S, while taxiing 
point divergence of 4X 10- 2 s- 1• The downward speed ·on runway 31-L, observed small trees bending over 
is about equal to that of a jet transport coming <;!.own from an estimated 20-30 kt wind blowing almost 
the usual 3° glide slope below 500 ft. · Therefore, · a parallel to runway 13-31 i.e., from the northwest. Then 
downburst of this threshold value tends to double the he looked toward the approach end of 22-L to find 
sinking speed of this type of aircraft trimmed for aircraft H getting into a nose-high attitude with its 
normal approach near . touchdown unless corrective left wing down. However, the pilot of aircraft H was . 
action is effective. Since an aircraft may fly . into a :able to recover to a more normal position before landing 
downburst cell abruptly and unexpectedly, immediate on 22-L. · 
recognition and quick action by. the pilot is ·necessary . · .The crosswind shear experienced by aircraft H was 
to overcome its effects. If the aircraft,.s posl.tion along spectacular. The 228° heading at 1955: 58 was changed 
the approach path does not provide sufficient time for to.237° aH956:04. lt is likely that the pilot responded 
pilot recognition and action, and aircraft response, the to the sudden increase of crosswind from his right. The 
flight might not be ii.hie to execute a missed .approach drift determined by the inertial navigation system was 
before contacting the ground. · 25°- 30° when the indicated air speed was 150 kt. A 
Three downburst cells (DBC) ?).ear .the approach end 60-70 kt crosswind would be required to produce such 
of runway 22-L were identined~DBCl, DBC2 ,and an extreme drift. · 
DBC3. Their widths· were less· than 3 mi arid were 
separated by relatively calm spaces as seen. in .Fig. 15. 
Apparently the outflow from downburst areas d.id not 
move into the runway area. None of the five aircrafts 
P through T encountered.problems· during their takeoff 
from runway 22-R. The wind tower, located about 
1l mi southwest of the approach end of 22-L, was not 
6. Flight paths and radar echoes 
Excellent scope pictures at the WSR-57 radar of the 
National Weather Service at Atlantic City were taken 
every 5 to 6 min. The times of pictures taken shortly 
before the accident are i 945.7, 1951.4, 1956.7 and 
2002A~ Echoes in these pictures· were contoured by · 
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FIG. 18. Downburst cells and approach paths at 2002.4 GMT, about 3 min before the accident. 
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their intensity. According to Gibson's (1975) interpre-
tation, the three-level contqurs represent the theoreti-
. cal rainfall rates of 0.1 , 0.5 and 1.0 inches h- 1• Since . 
height of the radar beam apove JFK was about 7000. 
ft, these rainfall rates could be less than those along 
the lower glide slope. 
The three iso-echo contours from the pictures were 
placed on a local map covering the area around JFK. 
The 1945.7 map is not reproduced here,. but from Fig. 
15 it is seen that DBCl was passing over the approach 
end of 22-L. Aircraft P took off from 22~R in heavy rain 
with windshield wipers at full speed. The rain ended as 
the aircraft was lifting off the runway. Aircraft B and 
C were affected by DBC1, which was already beginning 
to weaken. 
DBC2 was moving toward JFK followed by DBC3, 
which had crossed the East River into northern 
Brooklyn. As mentioned before, · all three .DBC's 
missed the four wind recorders in the New York area. 
An irony of fate had permitted four, or possibly five, 
DBC's to sneak through. between the wind recorders. 
Had they approached from due west, the first one 
certainly would have been caught by EWR. An ap-
proach from the northwest would have provided detec-
tion by both Central Park and LGA. 
At 1951.4, Fig. 16 shows that the spearhead echo 
extends from lo:wer Manhattan to the north of JFK. 
Three aircraft (D, E, F) landed without trouble between 
DBC1 and DBC2. Accident aircraft L was headed 
toward the south coast of Long Island. 
A helicopter en route from LGA to EWR encountered · 
DBC4. A thunderstorm with heavy rain was moving 
over the south half of Manhattan and the upper New 
York Bay area. At 1950 the helicopter, flying at 1200 ft 









FIG. 19. Winds and drafts (ft s-1) experienced by aircraft I, 
from Lockheed Exhibit 13-C. Curves are plotted as a fun£;tion of 
height (ft) above runway. 
. drastically reduced visibilfry. Ori the west side of the 
river the helicopter dropped to 600 ft while holding 
. 863 torque, which is the maximum continuous power. 
The path of the helicopter is included in Fig. 16. 
The map at 1956. 7 (Fig. 17) shows the accident 
aircraft L about 15 mi east of JFK flying around a 
rain cell and turning toward the approach zone. At this 
time aircraft H was just landing after suffering from a 
severe crosswind shear in DBC2, and aircraft I was 
approaching the center of DBC2. At 2002.4, the next 
radar time (Fig. 18), aircraft L was approaching the 
outer marker with the landing gear down, while DBC3 
was rapidly moving into the glide path ahead. A few 
minutes later at 2006, aircraft M, after being told to 
abandon approach, observed on airborne radar a circu-
lar ·cell about 3 mi in diameter located over the thresh-
old of runway 22-L. Aircraft L had hit the ground 
short. of the runway. 
BASED ON EXHIBIT 13-C 
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FIG. 20. Path of aircraft I through downburst cell No. 2. 
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FIG. 21. Winds and drafts (ft s-1) experienced by aircraft L, from Boe4ig Exhibit 
13-D. Curves are plotted as a function of height (ft) above the runway. 
7. Effects of downburst and wind shear 
Aircraft I, an L-1011, had initiated the missed ap-
proach through DBC2 after experiencing a heavy sink 
and right drift. T~e plane was obviously under the 
influence of a strong descending current and a cross-
wind from the left. The loss of indlcated air speed sug-
gests a significant decrease in the headwind component. 
In an attempt to reconstruct the pattern of airflow 
in the vertical ·plane, solutions of environmental winds 
by Lockheed engineers given in their Exhibit 13-C and 
its supplement (National Transportation Safety Board, 
1975) were examined. When the flow fields were de~ 
lineated from these two solutions, the one in the main 
exhibit rather than the supplement appeared to be 
more realistic from a meteorological point of view. 
AIRCRAFT 11 L11 (727) 
WINDSHIELD WIPER ON 
10,000' 8,000 
Fig. 19 shows that aircraft I was experiencing about 
15 ft s-1 headwind when it flew into heavy rain at 
about 400 ft. At 250 ft the headwind changed into a 
tailwind. The downward current then intensified to 21 
ft s-1 at 210 ft. 
Words cannot describe the effects of DBC2 on air-
craft I as. dramatically as can a careful look at Fig. 20. 
At 250 ft, after the indicated air speed dropped from 
140 to 120 kt, coupled with a· drift to the right, power 
was applied but faster sinking was still experienced, so 
a missed approach was executed as thrust was pushed 
to approximately takeoff range. The pilot was able to 
keep the wings level while the aircraft continued sink-
ing until it started recovering altitude at 60 ft above 
the ground. A few minutes later, the JFK airport was 




















FIG. 22. Path of aircraft L through down.burst cell No. 3. 
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closed due to the accident of aircraft L, and the L-1011 
was diverted to EWR. 17 
THUNDERSTORM PROJECT 
1946 a 1947 
Three wind profiles from the flight recorders of .air- ft 4 , , XIOOO • • 
10 
craft L, prepared under different assumptions by 261-------cr--------'-·1-'--F'o'ido 
Boeing engineers and included in their Exhibit 13-D 
(NTSB, 197S), were examined. Of these, the profile 
that was the most reasonable from a m~teorological 
point of view was the one computed by assuming that 
the approach power was a fuel flow of 4596 lb h-1 per 
engine, a constant until descending to 140 ft. There-
after, the power setting was 58%. The profile in Fig. 21 
8 
241------H >-----------Ohio 
1 ",____5 --< -----F. 
shows two maxima in downdraft speed, at about 600 
0 19
,__ __ --< ,.... _________ .,...._o. 
and 200 ft. The one at 220 ft reached 21 ft s-1 which z 
would induce a point divergence of 9.SX 10- 1 s-1 below 6 
4 the flight altitude. · o:: 
A h . . f (!) 161------< l,__--------r--F. s s own m Fig. 22 aircra t L descended slightly w 
9 above the glide slope in smooth air from the outer > 
marker to 730 ft, where light rain was encountered. ~ 14~----{ . .1-. ---------
1
- 0· 
As it approached 500 ft the windshield wipers were set / 
at high speed and the glide slope was intercepted. Fig. i: 
6 
,' 
21 indicates two strong headwind gusts at 25 and 28 ft (!) ,':'f.._F. 
l . W II 1-----cr--------..,, 
s- as it entered the downburst shown in Fig. 22. The ::x: _:;1 
headwind decreased from 28 to 7 ft s-1, while a S ft s-1 13 vi 
updraft changed to a 21 ft s-1 downburst. The loss of 9 :;. 1 0 · 
headwind and the downburst encountered accentuated .... ~~/ 
the descent to place the aircraft below the glide slope ~1 
5 4 I 
at 300 ft near the core of the downburst. The runway 
became visible at 2005 :06 at 130 ft. About 5 s later the 
initial impact took place. It is difficult to determine the 
crosswind component during the final descent below 
200 ft. The data of the flight recorder show that the 
headings were 227° at 200 ft, 226° at 150 ft, 225° at 







At the time of impact, the aircraft was very slightly · surtace"-~=D....::.....;i_~~i.;,...:>...:>..~~~~--=L--.,,J.,---,--__J 
to the right of the approach center line with the left 0 60 70 fps 
wing down. The left wing clipped three approach-light Frc. 23. Frequencies of ·downdraft .speeds measured by the 
standards, swinging the aircraft around the next three, Thunderstorm Project, compared with downburst speeds at low 
through the next four, .to scatter its pieces and debris levels. 
on the left side of the next five across Rockaway Blvd. 
One is struck by the similarity between the experi-
ences of aircraft I in DBC2 and aircraft L in DBC3, 
and might ask why ~ could not reco~er at 60 ft as I 
did. The changes in headwind component were about 
the same below 400 ft in both cases, and the peak · 
downdrafts were roughly the same. However, I ex-
perienced downdrafts of downburst magnitude (> 12 ft 
s- 1) for 3 s, barely reaching 20 ft s-1 momentarily, 
while L was in downburst values for 11 s, with speeds 
greater than 20 ft s-1 during this time. Due to increased 
.headwind components at 450 ft which were corrected 
for by increasing the ·glide angle, aircraft L apparently 
did not experience the drop in air speed at 300 ft 
which caused the pilot of I to .apply power. In the 8 s 
remaining before impact, L was subjected to the most 
intense downdrafts. Other factors might be differences 
in the manner in which power can be applied in the 
two different types of aircraft and in their equipment 
for automation. 
8. Spearhead echoes and downburst cells 
The downburst cells inside the spearhead echo of the 
JFK thunderstorm were different from most down-
draft cells found inside the ordinary thunderstorm. 
The downburst cells moved faster than normal while 
maintaining a very strong downdraft current near the 
ground. To show the difference in downward speeds, 
the downburst cells are compared in Fig. 23 with down-
drafts in the majority of thunderstorms as reported by 
B.yers and Braham (1949) from the Thunderstorm 
Project measurements of 1946-47. According to the . 
statistics, the mean downdraft values increase from 
theoretical zero at the surface to about 10 ft s-1 at the 
4000 ft level in the Florida and Ohio measurements. · 
The high values are approximately three times the 
mean values at various-altitudes (Fig. 23). It is evident 
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FIG. 24. A model of a spearhead echo. 
that the vertical speed of the downburst, 12 ft s-1 or 
larger at 300 ft above the ground, is about 10 times the 
mean. downdraft speed estimated from Thunderstorm 
Project data. 
The downburst cell has about the same horizontal 
dimension as the usual thunderstorm downdraft; there-
fore, it represents a much greater concentration of 
released energy. On the Thunderstorm Project no 
measurements were made above 26 000 ft, hence the 
level of origin of downdrafts detected at that height 
is unknown. The cell model was constructed with a 
cloud top at 43 000 ft and a downdraft starting down 
Fm. 25. More than 300 trees blown over by an intense outburst near Beckley, W. Va. 
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Frc. 26 . . Features of a spearhead echo 100 n mi south of Kansas City on 6 May 1975. Radar echoes at 2222 
GMT (left), SMS picture at 2222 GMT (center), and their superposition (right). 
from about 28 000 or 30 000 ft. Entrainment of en-
vironmental air was C:onsidered to be from across the 
cloud's lateral boundary. From stratospheric flights 
above thunderstorms, Fujita (1974) has found fast 
descending motion in thunderstorm turrets reaching 
above SO 000 ft. The model involves tops overshooting 
the anvil· then collapsing into a strong downdraft and 
trail of precipitation. Entrainment at the top transports 
dry air and large horizontal momentum downward. 
One of the greatest sinking speeds of the collapsing 
tops measured from a Learjet airplane by Fujita was 
41 m s- 1 (135 ft s-1). Sauvageot (1975) has shown by 
millimeter wavelength radar data in France that trails 
of precipitation fall from protuberances on top of con-
vective systems. · 
In the subsaturated mixture of cloud air with dry, 
entrained air from stratospheric levels, ice crystals sub-
lime rapidly, taking up heat from the air to make the 
downdraft cold and negatively buoyant. The collapsing 
top and entrained air accelerate the train of precipita-
tion and impart fast horizontal momentum from the 
stratosphere. A successive rise and fall of the top will 
create a family of downburst cells that moves away 
from the parent thunderstorm, as shown in Fig. 24. 
On a PPI scope, the family of downburst cells might 
appear as a spearhead echo pointing downwind. From 
a close range, leis than 30 mi for instance, an airborne 
radar may be able to identify a downburst cell as being 
a circular area of rain. The pilot of aircraft M observed 
a circular cell 2- 3 mi in diameter located over the 
approach end of runway 22 L. The time of observation 
was 2006 when aircraft M was following the accident 
aircraft L. 
As another example of a downburst and its radial 
outburst, Fujita witnessed fr()m a low-flying Cessna 
airplane various patterns of tree damage accompanying 
the 3 April 1974 tornado super-outbreak. At some dis-
tance away from the tornado paths, trees in the forests 
were blown over in radial directions, as if they had been 
blown outward from a downburst. A photograph of this 
phenomenon is shown -in Fig. 25. 
Another example of a spearhead echo was found on 
6 May 1975, the day of the Omaha tornado, when the 
WSR-57 radar of the National Weather Service at 
Kansas· City depicted the echo shown in Fig. 26. The 
echo, located "' 100 n mi south of the radar, showed a 
feature of a spearhead pointing toward the east-south-
east. A geostationary satellite picture taken at 2222, 
the time of the radar picture, shows an overshooting 
top. When the radar and satellite pictures were com-
bined into a single image, it was evident that the over-
shooting top and the spearhead echo coincided in their 
locations. 
9. Conclusions 
The research results presented in this paper suggest 
the existence of downburst cells in specific thunder-
storms. These cells seem to arise in spearhead echoes, 
as newly introduced in this paper. About 23 of the 
echoes in the New York area and Middle Atlantic 
States were spearhead echoes. 
Some obvious recommendations for avoiding the 
repetition of similar hazardous aircraft operations can 
be made, such as 1) operating additional wind sensors 
in the near-approach zone and climb-out end of the 
active runway, 2) monitoring wind speed and direction 
continuously during a thunderstorm, especially when 
a sea breeze or. lake breeze exists, 3) monitoring con-
tinuously the shape and motion of radar echoes using 
newly developed monitoring techniques and display 
equipment, and 4) monitoring continuously cloud-top 
activities, especially by satellite techniques. 
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The detection and identification of any downburst 
cells that constitute a potential hazard to approaching 
aircraft will be of little use unless procedures are de-
veloped for the immediate communication of this infor-
mation to the pilots of those aircraft. The rate .of 
change of such cells would require their uninterrupted 
analysis through the µse of radar, mesometeorological 
maps, surface wind information in the· approach zone, 
etc., in order to properly evaluate the thunderstorm 
without unnecessarily disrupting the approach and 
landing of aircraft at a particular airport. Once down~ 
burst cells are identified 11-s being a potential hazard to 
aircraft, air traffic controllers and pilots would have to 
take immediate action. 
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